AUTOPSY IN BROOKLYN
Dressen Explains Pitching Moves Involved In Bums' Death Struggle
"The Fourth Floor at 216 Montague St. houses the offices of Brooklyn's ill-starred Dodgers.
A year has passed since Branch Rickey cleaned out his desk in the famous old executive office which has been occupied in the past by such Dodger tycoons as Charles H. Ebbets, Stephen W. McKeever, Larry MacPhail and now by Walter F. O'Malley, Rickey's successor to the club's presidency. Externally the offices have been completely renovated. The tiny waiting room with its old lithograph of an early ball game in Hoboken has been expanded into a modernistic and roomy lounge. The color scheme is cool green instead of early Twentieth Century imitation walnut.
But it's still the Dodger headquarters and the human beings who work there still function within the mystic circle that makes Dodger baseball the oddest in the land.
At the switchboard sat Grace Therkildsen who has transmitted messages to and from Dodgerland these many years. 'I'm just getting out of it,' she sighed. 'It's been awful ... answering all those questions, why we didn't win after we had that thirteen and a half game lead, why Ralph Branca let Bobby Thomson hit that home run. I was stunned for days afterward.'
It is a fact no one associated with the Dodgers smiled for at least ten days after Leo Durocher's Giants snatched the 1951 National League pennant from the Dodgers' grasp at the zero hour on October 3. Even when the wassail was flowing fastest at the Giants' World Series headquarters Dodger partisans could be recognized at a glance. They sat soberly, deadpanned, morose, like close relatives at the wake of a rich uncle.
A couple weeks later, in his spacious office sat Emil J. Bavasi, the quiet, pale, personable young man who assumed the task of directing the Dodger varsity business management one year ago, following Rickey's departure for Pittsburgh. To all baseball, Bavasi is simply 'Buzzy,' a corruption of his last name and also a symbol of his friends' easy familiarity with a sincere, hard-working young man.
He had a pat answer for the general question: 'What happened to the Dodgers?' He said: 'We didn't lose it. They won it. Any team that wins thirty-nine of its last forty-seven games, like the Giants did, must win the pennant.'
But there was more to it, wasn't there? 'Sure there was. All right we did lose it. You can't blame the players. They tried with everything they had. You can't blame Chuck. He did everything he could. When the team began to slip in those last ten games, there was nothing we could do. You can't change horses in the middle of the steam. You can't trade Eddie Waitkus to the Dodgers for Gil Hodges, even if the Phillies would have traded Waitkus, because Hodges is a better first baseman anyhow. You can't bench Duke Snider. We used the best players available and they are still the best in baseball.'
Into the room came Chuck, Charlie Dressen, the little manager who has borne the brunt of criticism for the Dodger debacle. Charlie spent a difficult year as master of Ebbets Field and was on the newspapers' griddle even when his team sat atop the league. He had smiled bravely in public during the Series but now, in the privacy of Dodger headquarters, his face expressed his real feelings. He had been on the defensive, had been given little opportunity to reply- and he wanted to talk.
'It's like this,' he began. 'We lost the pennant in those last ten games. All we had to do was to win five of them, play at a .500 pace and we'd been in.
'I've been panned for not using Clem Labine until the playoff. He came to us from St. Paul with a bad ankle. I started him and he won four straight. I sent him into the first of the crucial ten games and he was knocked out in the first inning. He rested the next day and then I put him in the bullpen.
'Meantime I had to win. I decided to use only my best pitchers, Preacher Roe, Don Newcombe, Branca and Carl Erskine-'
Bavasi called to Allen Roth, the club statistician, who occupies an enjoining office. 'How many games did Roe, Newk, Ralph and Erskine win for us last season?'
'Seventy-one,' replied Roth.
'There you are,' said Buzzy. 'If four men win seventy-one games, you surely expect they'll take six out of any ten. They didn't.'
Getting down to specific games, there was that night contest in Philadelphia on September 28. The Dodgers led 3-0 in the sixth when the Phillies scored a run off Erskine. A walk and a homer tied the score in the eighth. Chuck had permitted Erskine to bat for himself at the top of the ninth. Why?
'Why take him out?' retorted the manager. 'There was no one on base.' He glanced at the floor. 'I don't know why I didn't take him out.' He leaned forward. 'Look here, this season was the same as that time I was with the Dodgers and we won the last eight games but the Cards kept winning and we lost the flag to them. It was the Giants' keeping winning that beat us, like the Cardinals in 1942.'
But the fact was that Erskine yielded a hit, a sacrifice and another hit in the Phillies' ninth, and the Dodgers lost, 4-3.
What happened to Clyde King, who won fourteen games, mainly in relief. Why wasn't he used more in the fatal stretch drive?
'We used him when we needed him,' said Buzzy. 'He failed in that last game against the Phillies.'
And Branca? What happened to him? Why were Roe and Newcombe worked overtime while Ralph sat on the sidelines? 'He lost to Boston on the twenty-fifth- they scored six runs in the first inning.'
Mention of Ralph Branca's name immediately brought to mind the historic ninth-inning homer by Bobby Thomson in the final playoff game. 'Branca didn't lose to the Giants for three years,' said Buzzy. Chuck chimed in with: 'He held the Giants to five hits in the first playoff game, although two of them were homers by Thomson and Monte Irvin.'
'What's Ralph's record against the Giants?' called Buzzy.
'It's 14-10,' replied Statistician Roth.
'But at the beginning of the season ... ?'
'It was 12-6. '
'And two of his four losses were in the playoffs,' said Chuck.
'Take that 12-6 record,' Buzzy persisted. 'That's a two to one advantage, isn't it? Well, say Branca had a 66 per cent chance to win a game in the playoffs. That's what we figured.'
Getting to cases, why use Branca, a fast ball pitcher, in relief against Thomson who hits fastballs, after Newcombe weakened in that fatal ninth? The score was Brooklyn 4, New York 2, with two Giants on. Wouldn't a curve ball hurler have been the better choice as relief?
'Ralph throws a great curve,' said Chuck. 'His first pitch to Thomson was perfect- it broke in and was unhittable. The second got away from him, and Thomson pickled it.'
Perhaps a dispy-do slowballer, King, might have got Thomson out?
Chuck Dressen looked wistfully through the window overlooking Court Street. He did not reply.
'I give all the credit in the world to Leo Durocher and the Giants,' said Buzzy Bavasi.
Well, the pennant race is history now, along with the Battle of Waterloo. How about next season?
'We'd make a deal for a pitcher,' said Buzzy, 'if we could, but I don't think it's possible. The team is still the best in baseball, even if it lost out this year. You can trace some of our trouble to injuries ... Newcome and Branca came up with bad arms, Pee Wee Reese and Jackie Robinson got hurt. But look up and down that lineup- where can you find better? At first, at the pivot, at third, in the outfield, catchers, pitchers? You can't.
'We could use another pitcher- who can't? No, we don't need another second-string catcher. Rube Walker could be first string for at least three clubs in the league- he's slow but he can hit and receive with the best. And show me another second-stringer as strong.
'We may look at our three best minor league catchers, Steve Lembo and Dick Teed, who were with St. Paul, and Charlie Thompson, who was with Mobile.
'We are not going to sell our best minor league prospects. The club sold eight players two years because it needed the money- financial troubles make you do things you don't want to do. We could have used Chico Carrasquel and Irv Noren. Carrasquel would have been the finest infield replacement in the game. And Noren, there's a great ball player, would have been our left fielder.
'We had a great minor league season. We had twenty clubs. Six won pennants. Seventeen were in the playoffs. We must have some valuable material there, and when the teams gather next spring we'll decide which boys should be advanced.
'Yes,' concluded Buzzy, 'the team's morale will not be affected by that licking. They don't feel sorry for themselves and we in the front office don't feel sorry for our selves. The Giants proved they were the better team ... in 1951.
'But I personally feel sorry for the folks in Brooklyn ... not the box holders who come to the game to spend an hour or two in the open air and cheer their favorites, but for the little guys who save up a few dollars and go to a game now and then. They took it hard.'
Buzzy Bavasi and Chuck Dressen sat silently thinking. A clock ticked. Faintly through the open window came the thin sound of chimes ringing noon in the tower of Borough Hall.
They were taking it hard, too."
-Charles Dexter, Baseball Digest, January 1952
SAME SITUATION, SAME STRATEGY
What Blew for Dressen Worked for Stengel
"Manager Chuck Dressen of the Brooklyn Dodgers had to make a decision. He made it and the New York Giants won the National League pennant.
They're still second-guessing Dressen because he told his pitcher to throw to Bobby Thomson in the ninth inning with the Giants trailing 4-2, one out, runners on third and second, and with first base wide open.
What Thomson did to that strategy has gone into the records as one of the greatest thrills in diamond history. He belted the ball into the stands for the three-run homer that gave the Giants a 5-4 triumph and shoved them into the 1951 World Series.
And the die-hard Brooklyn fans made Manager Dressen the goat for not walking Thomson to set up a game-ending double play.
The incident has such a parallel that it is difficult to believe. Yet, Casey Stengel of the New York Yankees had to make exactly the same decision. He took the identical course that was followed by Dressen. Now he is the manager of a World Series champion for the third time in his first three years with the club- a record.
It recurred exactly one week from the day from the final Giant-Dodgers playoff. The Yankees led the Giants this time. The score was the same, 4-2. The Giants already had scored one run in the ninth inning just as they had in the playoff thriller.
There were runners on second and third, just as there had been before. And the batter was the same Bobby Thomson, the string-bean Giant third baseman who had hit the dramatic home run that put the Giants into the Series.
Again first base was wide open. Again there was only one out. Once more there was the opportunity to walk the dangerous Thomson and take a chance that the next batter would hit into a double play made easier by the choice of a force play at any base.
But Stengel followed the same route which had made Dressen a defeated manager with horns. He ordered southpaw Bob Kuzava to pitch to Thomson. He did and Bobby's best was a fly ball for the second out.
One run scored after the catch but when Hank Bauer made his falling-down snare of pinch hitter Sal Yvars' sinking liner, the Series was ended and Stengel was the champion again while the second-guessers continued to take pot shots at Dressen."
by Lyall Smith, condensed from the Detroit Free Press (Baseball Digest, January 1952)
DRESSEN PUT WINNER ON FIVE TIMES IN '51 AND WON EACH TIME!
"Charlie Dressen, the despondent Brooklyn manager, was kicking himself long after the final out of the historic third game of the National League playoff for playing the game by the book. With first base open in the ninth inning, he did not have the Giants' Bobby Thomson intentionally passed with the winning run.
'I thought of it,' admitted the Brooklyn manager.
'Why I wouldn't think of it? I passed the winning run five times during the season and won every time. I passed Stan Musial three times with the winning run, with a left-handed hitter following him, because he is a solid .350 hitter and the other guy wasn't.'
Then why didn't he pass Thomson, Dressen was asked. For once the breezy bantam did not have a ready answer. He just shrugged.
Finally, he said, 'The next guy could have hit a home run, too.'
Scheduled to follow Thomson was Willie Mays, the Giants' gifted rookie who, although not impressive in the playoffs or in the World Series that followed, is certainly capable of hitting a home run.
He also might have hit a long double, scoring the fleet Thomson from first. He might have singled, putting Thomson on third with only one out.
Or Mays might have hit into a double play, as he had in the seventh inning, ending the game and giving the Dodgers the pennant instead of the horrors.
'Never walk the winning run- unless you have a Ruth, Greenberg or Musial hitting, and even then you ought to think three times,' say baseball tacticians.
But a Ruth, Greenberg or Musial was not hitting. It was only Thomson.
The real reason why Dressen did not purposely pass Thomson with the winning run, then, was that he underrated the Giants' third baseman. Thomson hit .383 during the forty-seven-game streak in which the Giants won thirty-nine games to steal the pennant. Nobody except his closest relatives thinks he is that kind of hitter.
As Thomson himself said during the post-game delirium, 'If I'd been a good hitter, I never would have hit it. It was a bad pitch.'
'Nobody talks about passing a winning run until something happens,' said Dressen bitterly. Managers play it both ways, of course, with good and bad results.
In the 1947 World Series at Brooklyn [when Dressen was a Yankee coach], Bucky Harris of the New York Yankees purposely passed winning run, and Cookie Lavagetto, now a Dodgers' coach, promptly doubled it home for a 3-2 win to ruin Bill Bevens' no-hitter."
by Harold Kaese, condensed from the Boston Globe (Baseball Digest, January 1952)
"During most of Charlie's playing career, which began in 1919, he held down third base. He hit the majors with Cincinnati in 1925. With them from 1925-30 and for a few games in 1931, he played briefly for the Giants in 1933.
Charlie has managed the Reds and coached the Dodgers and Yankees. He has been the Dodgers' pilot since 1951."
-1952 Bowman No. 188
"Though they lost the pennant to the Giants in 1951, Chuck's Dodger team won more ball games (97) than any Dodger team since 1942.
He started his playing career with Moline in 1919 and finished with the Giants in 1933. Chuck managed Nashville from 1932-34 and in 1938, Cincinnati from the end of '34 through 1937 and Oakland in 1949 and '50. He was on the Dodger coaching staff from 1939-46 and the Yankee staff in 1947 and '48."
1952 Topps No. 377
Tuesday, September 18, 2018
Saturday, September 1, 2018
1952 Yankee of the Past: Leo Durocher
LEO DUROCHER: INSIDE STORY OF LOCKMAN SHIFT
Durocher Gambled Job on Move that Keyed Flag
"This is the story of Leo Durocher's greatest gamble. It is the story of how the New York Giants won their 'miracle' pennant. It is the story of Whitey Lockman and how he was shifted from the outfield to first base over the heated protests of Leo's employer, Horace Stoneham. It is the story of how Durocher staked his job on Lockman and won.
In the official analysis of the Giants' incredible climb to the top, there are three milestones: Lockman's shift to the infield with Monte Irvin moving to the outfield, the promotion of Willie Mays and the conversion of Bobby Thomson to third base. But the first was Lockman's, on May 21 in St. Louis, and Durocher gambled his future on the shift.
The inside story started last winter when the Giants, seemingly more for publicity purposes than any other, announced that Lockman had been sent a first baseman's glove and was asked to accustom himself to its feel. It could have been little more than publicity then because Lockman was used only briefly at first in spring training.
Strange at a new position, Whitey showed little feeling for the base. Irvin, at least, had familiarity with the post, even though observers at the Giants' St. Petersburg training camp could not classify him as a big league first sacker defensively, much less a pennant-winning one.
After a few days, Durocher announced the experiment ended.
'I know now Lockman can play the base if I need him, maybe even better than Irvin can,' Durocher said cryptically. 'But we'll be a better team with Whitey out and Monte in.'
What Leo did not say at the time was that he had proposed the exchange of positions to Stoneham but Horace, after taking a few looks at Whitey, was against it despite Lockman's poor outfield throwing.
So the Giants went into the season and into the start of their eleven-game losing streak that all but killed them off at the beginning with two men playing positions at which they could not do their best.
Several times Leo attempted to reopen a conversation with Stoneham concerning Lockman and Irvin. Monte, Stoneham conceded, could play the outfield, but Lockman would be lost at first base.
'Lockman's no first baseman,' Horace said adamantly. 'Maybe he'll be able to adapt himself after a while, but with what's happened to us so far we can't take the chance. I'm against the shift.'
Durocher was aware of what the downward trend of the Giants' season was doing to Stoneham. Pennantless since 1937, the Giant president, who as a boy had reveled in the pennant-winning teams John McGraw had led for his father, had caught the contagious enthusiasm of the Giants' training camp last spring.
But as April turned into May and the Giants trailed Brooklyn by a seemingly irretrievable margin of games, particularly in the losing column, Stoneham's spirits fell with his club. Leo later was to be rehired for 1952, but at that point he could not possibly know what was ahead.
Leo wanted to keep his job, but even more, he wanted to win the 1951 pennant. The collapse of the Giants had to reflect on him. After so many years of being one of baseball's focal figures, he still could not point to more than one winning year as a manager. In making him the manager of the Giants, Stoneham had risked alienating many of his old customers, who had patiently waited for The Year. This was to be it, but the Giants stumbled in the race, seemingly beaten by their bad start and unable to untrack themselves.
At few times in his life was Durocher required to make a more vital decision. He enlisted the aid of Chub Feeney, the capable and likeable vice president of the Giants, who is Stoneham's nephew.
Chub agreed to be Leo's courier to the boss. He pleaded Durocher's case for shifting Lockman to first and Irvin to the outfield.
Stoneham listened and then he said: 'Okay, tell Leo he can make it. I don't think it will work but tell him okay. Tell him if it doesn't work out, it's his neck.'
That was Feeney's message to Leo as the Giants were in the West and Durocher said: 'That's fair enough. It'll work out.'
On May 21 in St. Louis, Lockman played his first game of the season at first base. On October 3 the Giants won the flag in the most dramatic finish baseball has ever experienced. It was a complete vindication for Durocher. The first to tell him so was Horace Stoneham."
-Milton Gross, New York Post (Baseball Digest, January 1952)
PRESSURE? GIANTS DIDN'T, WON'T FEEL IT, SAYS DUROCHER
"The New York Giants, history-making champions of the National League, did not have a clubhouse meeting for over two months as they careened in victory madness down the stretch of the 1951's hysterical pennant race.
Leo Durocher, the boss himself, disclosed that fact in Minneapolis on one of his last banquet stops before spring training.
I had asked Leo if he thought there would any pressure attendant upon the champs this season as they stepped out, realizing they were champions, that not too many hostiles were fond of them and that the boom was ready to be lowered.
'Pressure?' Leo laughed. 'Let me tell you something. We were way behind last year. Remember? Then we started to go. I said to myself, what the heck, if we get close I've got only two men who ever played on a recent championship before- Eddie Stanky and Alvin Dark (both with the Boston Braves in 1948). They'll steady the boys.
'So we're going along knocking people off and the boys are singing in the clubhouse every day before the game. I see they're relaxed and I leave'em alone. Pressure? Nobody felt any. They just seemed to realize they were going to catch Brooklyn and, if they caught the Dodgers, they'd beat'em. Not a man felt the pressure.
'It was a miracle, I tell you. I've been on four championship clubs myself. I know when the race got tight and we caught somebody or somebody caught us, we felt it. How you feel it then. You're all tight and your hands are wet and you perspire and you give it all you got. But this gang? They were singing before games, I tell you.
'So how in the world is 1952, and whatever it may contain, going to affect them, make them tight? No sir, not this gang!' "
-Halsey Hall, Minneapolis Tribune (Baseball Digest, April 1952)
LEO DUROCHER- AN ALL-YEAR MANAGER NOW?
"The scene was the press room in one of the big league parks. Around the table were some of the nation's best informed baseball writers. The discussion of the moment centered on Leo Durocher and his managerial ability.
'The trouble with Leo,' spoke up one scribe, 'is that he's too much of a get-ready-quick guy. He's great whipping a team into shape- there's nobody better. By Opening Day he usually has his men, especially his pitchers, in midseason form. But no player can stay at his midseason peak from April through September. He burns out. Check the records and you'll see what I mean. You'll find that a Durocher team always starts strong- and finishes weak.'
In the same press room late last summer a similar group of writers again was weighing Durocher's managing acumen.
'He's strictly a second-half manager,' was the thread of this discourse this time. 'He experiments so much at the beginning of the season he messes up the ball club and it takes him half a year to straighten it out. You'd think spring training would give him a line on his club for the rest of the year, but no, he changes every time a guy goes into a slump.'
Conflicting though they might seem, both observations apparently were correct. The Early Durocher liked to lay up for a fast start. That was the non-wavering pattern of his entire managerial career through 1949, with the sole exception of his freshman year at the helm in 1939. Starting in 1940 and continuing through 1949 (you'll recall he sat out 1947 under suspension from Commissioner Chandler and divided 1948 between Brooklyn and the New York Giants), every one of his eight seasons showed a pronounced margin in favor of the first half.
His teams (Brooklyn, 1940-46; the New York Giants, 1949) usually played from forty and seventy-eight percentage points better ball during the first half of the season than they did from mid-July on. And one year, 1940, the difference was as much as 123 points! Measured by another yardstick, Durocher's 1940-49 teams averaged four more victories during the first half of the season than in the second half and once (1940) won ten more games before the halfway mark than they did afterwards.
Even in 1941, the first of his two championship seasons, Durocher was hardly an all-year manager. He had his Dodgers playing .675 ball in the first half of the season, but they tailed off to .623 in the second half- and .623 in itself wouldn't have been sufficient to win the National League pennant that year. If they had played all year the way they did in the second half, the Dodgers, instead of winning the flag, would have finished eleven percentage points behind the St. Louis Cardinals, who wound up with a .634 percentage.
It was in 1950 that Durocher suddenly reversed his field. When the Giants lost a double-header to the St. Louis Cardinals July 19, they were twelve games below .500 and twelve and a half games behind the Cards. Breaking the season exactly down the middle, after the seventy-seventh game as was done for all other seasons, the Giants had a 35-42-.455 first half and a 51-26-.662 second half. Breaking the season where Durocher and his men did, between the night of July 19 and the morning of July 20, they finished up with 50-20-.714 as against a 36-48-.429 start.
This, then, is the blueprint that carried over from 1950 for last year's whamdinger. Although the Giants didn't start cutting down Brooklyn's New York-to-California lead of thirteen and one-half games until well into August last year, the season can be bisected as were the others at the seventy-seven game point with noticeable results. The Giants played 42-35-.545 ball in the first half of the season, 56-24-.700 ball the second half.
Now, in 1952, Durocher has reverted to the Old Formula- for the break-from-the tape, at least. There certainly was nothing experimental about the Giants' lineups the first part of this season. He started with a pat batting order and, except for a mild revision of dropping Al Dark down a few notches in late April, kept playing that lineup day after day, injury substitutions excepted, of course.
What about the second half of 1952? Did Durocher bring along his team too fast this spring, allegedly his big shortcoming in his earlier years of managing, or did he pace them well and is thus destined to get a good second half out of it as he did the last two seasons?
If he does combine two good halves, Durocher then and only then will reach managerial maturity as an all-year manager."
-Fred Fichonne (Baseball Digest, July 1952)
HOW A 'BRAIN' DOES IT
HERE'S DUROCHER'S "INSIDE" ON THOMSON
"Last season the New York Giants succeeded in wiping out what appeared to be in August an ineradicable deficit. They won the National League pennant and Leo Durocher was hailed as a miracle manager. This year the Giants started off on a brisk pace. You heard from a rival pilot like Eddie Sawyer of the Philadelphia Phillies that from the start of the current campaign, he considered the Giants stronger than the Brooklyn Dodgers. So if Durocher finishes in front again he will be doing 'the expected.'
'So I was a genius last year,' Durocher was telling a small group of friends the other night. 'Well, let me tell you exactly what makes a genius. We were in St. Louis in midseason and the ball club was going bad. The batters weren't hitting and the pitching was erratic. We had lost two games to the St. Louis Cardinals and I was desperate.
'Only three of us were left in the clubhouse, Larry Jansen, myself and the trainer. I got to thinking out loud and I remarked that I'd trade any name on the club, especially Bobby Thomson. Everybody had been telling me that Thomson was great in 1947. Well, I was out of baseball in 1947 and I hadn't seen him. This was 1951 and up to now I had never seen him do anything great. How long was I supposed to wait for him to come back with another season like 1947?
'I turned to Jansen. 'Say, you were with the Giants in 1947. Can you tell me what made Thomson so good in 1947 and so bad now?' Larry acted as if he had been waiting for me to ask the question.
' 'Sure, I can tell what's wrong with Thomson,' he said. 'He stands differently. I wouldn't think of saying anything to Bobby because he might think it's none of my business, but I can tell you.'
'I jumped out of my chair and asked Jansen to show me the difference. We spread a piece of newspaper on the floor and used that for home plate. I handed Jansen a bat and told him to stand over the newspaper and demonstrate Thompson's batting stance- then and now. Bobby was standing up straight. In fact, he was almost leaning back. But in 1947, according to Jansen, he used to lean forward in a crouch that made him look like a right-handed Stan Musial.
'That was all I wanted to know. In the ball park the next day, the first time Thomson stepped up to the plate in batting practice, I asked him how he used to hit. He leaned forward. 'Why don't you hit that way now?' It seems that some one had been advising him to stand up straight. His friend was a fireman, or some one equally inexperienced from a baseball standpoint. 'Well, you try hitting from that crouch,' I told him.
'Henry Thompson had been playing third base for us and he had failed to get a hit in something like thirty times at bat. I had to get him out of the lineup, but I also had to have someone to take his place. Almost any man would have been an improvement at the plate, but not everyone would have been able to play third base.
'So I turned to Thomson again. He had played some in the infield and I asked him if he would care to try it again. He didn't mind. He had played third base in Jersey City before the Giants called him up to the National League. On the same day he was going to change positions and change his batting stance. What could he or the entire ball club lose? Things were pretty bad.
'I guess you all know what happened, although you may not remember that particular game. Thomson hit a home run that tied it up in the late innings and he hit another one to win it for us in extra innings. We went on from there and I was a genius.
'Go back to 1950 and consider the case of Sal Maglie. Our troubles in the spring were almost as numerous as they were the following year, although we didn't have an eleven-game losing streak. I used up all the pitching I had in a double-header during a Western trip and I was scraping the bottom of the barrel. Maglie hadn't started a ball game, but I had no one else left, so I told him to go out there and see what he could do. He won the ball game. What would you do if you were the manager? You'd pitch him again. That's what I did. I had discovered that Maglie was a winning pitcher and I was a genius.'
The 1952 decision on Mr. Durocher as a genius is being held in abeyance pending the printing of the National League standings late in September."
-Hy Goldberg, condensed from the Newark News (Baseball Digest, July 1952)
"On August 13, 1951, Durocher's Dandies were 13 1/2 games out of first, yet they won the pennant in an exciting finish, beating the Dodgers in the third game of a playoff. The stretch drive included a 16-game winning streak. The Giants' skipper was hailed as the manager of the year."
-1952 Bowman No. 146
"Leo's long and exciting career as a player and manager reached its peak as 'Lippy' led his Giants to a never-to-be-forgotten pennant triumph over the Dodgers in 1951.
In 12 seasons as a manager he has won two pennants, finished second three times and third four times. In 1941 he led the Dodgers to their first pennant in 21 years.
He was a shortstop on the Yankees of the Ruthian era and was a famed member of the Cardinal Gas House Gang before coming to the Dodgers as a player-manager."
-1952 Topps No. 315
"Leo managed the Giants into the most exciting pennant won in the National League in 1951. One of the most knowledgeable of baseball men, Leo has been a manager since 1939.
Before coming to the Giants in 1948, Leo was the Brooklyn leader. As a player, he appeared in the majors with the Yankees, Reds, Cardinals and Dodgers.
A colorful personality."
-1952 Red Man No. NL-1
Durocher Gambled Job on Move that Keyed Flag
"This is the story of Leo Durocher's greatest gamble. It is the story of how the New York Giants won their 'miracle' pennant. It is the story of Whitey Lockman and how he was shifted from the outfield to first base over the heated protests of Leo's employer, Horace Stoneham. It is the story of how Durocher staked his job on Lockman and won.
In the official analysis of the Giants' incredible climb to the top, there are three milestones: Lockman's shift to the infield with Monte Irvin moving to the outfield, the promotion of Willie Mays and the conversion of Bobby Thomson to third base. But the first was Lockman's, on May 21 in St. Louis, and Durocher gambled his future on the shift.
The inside story started last winter when the Giants, seemingly more for publicity purposes than any other, announced that Lockman had been sent a first baseman's glove and was asked to accustom himself to its feel. It could have been little more than publicity then because Lockman was used only briefly at first in spring training.
Strange at a new position, Whitey showed little feeling for the base. Irvin, at least, had familiarity with the post, even though observers at the Giants' St. Petersburg training camp could not classify him as a big league first sacker defensively, much less a pennant-winning one.
After a few days, Durocher announced the experiment ended.
'I know now Lockman can play the base if I need him, maybe even better than Irvin can,' Durocher said cryptically. 'But we'll be a better team with Whitey out and Monte in.'
What Leo did not say at the time was that he had proposed the exchange of positions to Stoneham but Horace, after taking a few looks at Whitey, was against it despite Lockman's poor outfield throwing.
So the Giants went into the season and into the start of their eleven-game losing streak that all but killed them off at the beginning with two men playing positions at which they could not do their best.
Several times Leo attempted to reopen a conversation with Stoneham concerning Lockman and Irvin. Monte, Stoneham conceded, could play the outfield, but Lockman would be lost at first base.
'Lockman's no first baseman,' Horace said adamantly. 'Maybe he'll be able to adapt himself after a while, but with what's happened to us so far we can't take the chance. I'm against the shift.'
Durocher was aware of what the downward trend of the Giants' season was doing to Stoneham. Pennantless since 1937, the Giant president, who as a boy had reveled in the pennant-winning teams John McGraw had led for his father, had caught the contagious enthusiasm of the Giants' training camp last spring.
But as April turned into May and the Giants trailed Brooklyn by a seemingly irretrievable margin of games, particularly in the losing column, Stoneham's spirits fell with his club. Leo later was to be rehired for 1952, but at that point he could not possibly know what was ahead.
Leo wanted to keep his job, but even more, he wanted to win the 1951 pennant. The collapse of the Giants had to reflect on him. After so many years of being one of baseball's focal figures, he still could not point to more than one winning year as a manager. In making him the manager of the Giants, Stoneham had risked alienating many of his old customers, who had patiently waited for The Year. This was to be it, but the Giants stumbled in the race, seemingly beaten by their bad start and unable to untrack themselves.
At few times in his life was Durocher required to make a more vital decision. He enlisted the aid of Chub Feeney, the capable and likeable vice president of the Giants, who is Stoneham's nephew.
Chub agreed to be Leo's courier to the boss. He pleaded Durocher's case for shifting Lockman to first and Irvin to the outfield.
Stoneham listened and then he said: 'Okay, tell Leo he can make it. I don't think it will work but tell him okay. Tell him if it doesn't work out, it's his neck.'
That was Feeney's message to Leo as the Giants were in the West and Durocher said: 'That's fair enough. It'll work out.'
On May 21 in St. Louis, Lockman played his first game of the season at first base. On October 3 the Giants won the flag in the most dramatic finish baseball has ever experienced. It was a complete vindication for Durocher. The first to tell him so was Horace Stoneham."
-Milton Gross, New York Post (Baseball Digest, January 1952)
PRESSURE? GIANTS DIDN'T, WON'T FEEL IT, SAYS DUROCHER
"The New York Giants, history-making champions of the National League, did not have a clubhouse meeting for over two months as they careened in victory madness down the stretch of the 1951's hysterical pennant race.
Leo Durocher, the boss himself, disclosed that fact in Minneapolis on one of his last banquet stops before spring training.
I had asked Leo if he thought there would any pressure attendant upon the champs this season as they stepped out, realizing they were champions, that not too many hostiles were fond of them and that the boom was ready to be lowered.
'Pressure?' Leo laughed. 'Let me tell you something. We were way behind last year. Remember? Then we started to go. I said to myself, what the heck, if we get close I've got only two men who ever played on a recent championship before- Eddie Stanky and Alvin Dark (both with the Boston Braves in 1948). They'll steady the boys.
'So we're going along knocking people off and the boys are singing in the clubhouse every day before the game. I see they're relaxed and I leave'em alone. Pressure? Nobody felt any. They just seemed to realize they were going to catch Brooklyn and, if they caught the Dodgers, they'd beat'em. Not a man felt the pressure.
'It was a miracle, I tell you. I've been on four championship clubs myself. I know when the race got tight and we caught somebody or somebody caught us, we felt it. How you feel it then. You're all tight and your hands are wet and you perspire and you give it all you got. But this gang? They were singing before games, I tell you.
'So how in the world is 1952, and whatever it may contain, going to affect them, make them tight? No sir, not this gang!' "
-Halsey Hall, Minneapolis Tribune (Baseball Digest, April 1952)
LEO DUROCHER- AN ALL-YEAR MANAGER NOW?
"The scene was the press room in one of the big league parks. Around the table were some of the nation's best informed baseball writers. The discussion of the moment centered on Leo Durocher and his managerial ability.
'The trouble with Leo,' spoke up one scribe, 'is that he's too much of a get-ready-quick guy. He's great whipping a team into shape- there's nobody better. By Opening Day he usually has his men, especially his pitchers, in midseason form. But no player can stay at his midseason peak from April through September. He burns out. Check the records and you'll see what I mean. You'll find that a Durocher team always starts strong- and finishes weak.'
In the same press room late last summer a similar group of writers again was weighing Durocher's managing acumen.
'He's strictly a second-half manager,' was the thread of this discourse this time. 'He experiments so much at the beginning of the season he messes up the ball club and it takes him half a year to straighten it out. You'd think spring training would give him a line on his club for the rest of the year, but no, he changes every time a guy goes into a slump.'
Conflicting though they might seem, both observations apparently were correct. The Early Durocher liked to lay up for a fast start. That was the non-wavering pattern of his entire managerial career through 1949, with the sole exception of his freshman year at the helm in 1939. Starting in 1940 and continuing through 1949 (you'll recall he sat out 1947 under suspension from Commissioner Chandler and divided 1948 between Brooklyn and the New York Giants), every one of his eight seasons showed a pronounced margin in favor of the first half.
His teams (Brooklyn, 1940-46; the New York Giants, 1949) usually played from forty and seventy-eight percentage points better ball during the first half of the season than they did from mid-July on. And one year, 1940, the difference was as much as 123 points! Measured by another yardstick, Durocher's 1940-49 teams averaged four more victories during the first half of the season than in the second half and once (1940) won ten more games before the halfway mark than they did afterwards.
Even in 1941, the first of his two championship seasons, Durocher was hardly an all-year manager. He had his Dodgers playing .675 ball in the first half of the season, but they tailed off to .623 in the second half- and .623 in itself wouldn't have been sufficient to win the National League pennant that year. If they had played all year the way they did in the second half, the Dodgers, instead of winning the flag, would have finished eleven percentage points behind the St. Louis Cardinals, who wound up with a .634 percentage.
It was in 1950 that Durocher suddenly reversed his field. When the Giants lost a double-header to the St. Louis Cardinals July 19, they were twelve games below .500 and twelve and a half games behind the Cards. Breaking the season exactly down the middle, after the seventy-seventh game as was done for all other seasons, the Giants had a 35-42-.455 first half and a 51-26-.662 second half. Breaking the season where Durocher and his men did, between the night of July 19 and the morning of July 20, they finished up with 50-20-.714 as against a 36-48-.429 start.
This, then, is the blueprint that carried over from 1950 for last year's whamdinger. Although the Giants didn't start cutting down Brooklyn's New York-to-California lead of thirteen and one-half games until well into August last year, the season can be bisected as were the others at the seventy-seven game point with noticeable results. The Giants played 42-35-.545 ball in the first half of the season, 56-24-.700 ball the second half.
Now, in 1952, Durocher has reverted to the Old Formula- for the break-from-the tape, at least. There certainly was nothing experimental about the Giants' lineups the first part of this season. He started with a pat batting order and, except for a mild revision of dropping Al Dark down a few notches in late April, kept playing that lineup day after day, injury substitutions excepted, of course.
What about the second half of 1952? Did Durocher bring along his team too fast this spring, allegedly his big shortcoming in his earlier years of managing, or did he pace them well and is thus destined to get a good second half out of it as he did the last two seasons?
If he does combine two good halves, Durocher then and only then will reach managerial maturity as an all-year manager."
-Fred Fichonne (Baseball Digest, July 1952)
HOW A 'BRAIN' DOES IT
HERE'S DUROCHER'S "INSIDE" ON THOMSON
"Last season the New York Giants succeeded in wiping out what appeared to be in August an ineradicable deficit. They won the National League pennant and Leo Durocher was hailed as a miracle manager. This year the Giants started off on a brisk pace. You heard from a rival pilot like Eddie Sawyer of the Philadelphia Phillies that from the start of the current campaign, he considered the Giants stronger than the Brooklyn Dodgers. So if Durocher finishes in front again he will be doing 'the expected.'
'So I was a genius last year,' Durocher was telling a small group of friends the other night. 'Well, let me tell you exactly what makes a genius. We were in St. Louis in midseason and the ball club was going bad. The batters weren't hitting and the pitching was erratic. We had lost two games to the St. Louis Cardinals and I was desperate.
'Only three of us were left in the clubhouse, Larry Jansen, myself and the trainer. I got to thinking out loud and I remarked that I'd trade any name on the club, especially Bobby Thomson. Everybody had been telling me that Thomson was great in 1947. Well, I was out of baseball in 1947 and I hadn't seen him. This was 1951 and up to now I had never seen him do anything great. How long was I supposed to wait for him to come back with another season like 1947?
'I turned to Jansen. 'Say, you were with the Giants in 1947. Can you tell me what made Thomson so good in 1947 and so bad now?' Larry acted as if he had been waiting for me to ask the question.
' 'Sure, I can tell what's wrong with Thomson,' he said. 'He stands differently. I wouldn't think of saying anything to Bobby because he might think it's none of my business, but I can tell you.'
'I jumped out of my chair and asked Jansen to show me the difference. We spread a piece of newspaper on the floor and used that for home plate. I handed Jansen a bat and told him to stand over the newspaper and demonstrate Thompson's batting stance- then and now. Bobby was standing up straight. In fact, he was almost leaning back. But in 1947, according to Jansen, he used to lean forward in a crouch that made him look like a right-handed Stan Musial.
'That was all I wanted to know. In the ball park the next day, the first time Thomson stepped up to the plate in batting practice, I asked him how he used to hit. He leaned forward. 'Why don't you hit that way now?' It seems that some one had been advising him to stand up straight. His friend was a fireman, or some one equally inexperienced from a baseball standpoint. 'Well, you try hitting from that crouch,' I told him.
'Henry Thompson had been playing third base for us and he had failed to get a hit in something like thirty times at bat. I had to get him out of the lineup, but I also had to have someone to take his place. Almost any man would have been an improvement at the plate, but not everyone would have been able to play third base.
'So I turned to Thomson again. He had played some in the infield and I asked him if he would care to try it again. He didn't mind. He had played third base in Jersey City before the Giants called him up to the National League. On the same day he was going to change positions and change his batting stance. What could he or the entire ball club lose? Things were pretty bad.
'I guess you all know what happened, although you may not remember that particular game. Thomson hit a home run that tied it up in the late innings and he hit another one to win it for us in extra innings. We went on from there and I was a genius.
'Go back to 1950 and consider the case of Sal Maglie. Our troubles in the spring were almost as numerous as they were the following year, although we didn't have an eleven-game losing streak. I used up all the pitching I had in a double-header during a Western trip and I was scraping the bottom of the barrel. Maglie hadn't started a ball game, but I had no one else left, so I told him to go out there and see what he could do. He won the ball game. What would you do if you were the manager? You'd pitch him again. That's what I did. I had discovered that Maglie was a winning pitcher and I was a genius.'
The 1952 decision on Mr. Durocher as a genius is being held in abeyance pending the printing of the National League standings late in September."
-Hy Goldberg, condensed from the Newark News (Baseball Digest, July 1952)
"On August 13, 1951, Durocher's Dandies were 13 1/2 games out of first, yet they won the pennant in an exciting finish, beating the Dodgers in the third game of a playoff. The stretch drive included a 16-game winning streak. The Giants' skipper was hailed as the manager of the year."
-1952 Bowman No. 146
"Leo's long and exciting career as a player and manager reached its peak as 'Lippy' led his Giants to a never-to-be-forgotten pennant triumph over the Dodgers in 1951.
In 12 seasons as a manager he has won two pennants, finished second three times and third four times. In 1941 he led the Dodgers to their first pennant in 21 years.
He was a shortstop on the Yankees of the Ruthian era and was a famed member of the Cardinal Gas House Gang before coming to the Dodgers as a player-manager."
-1952 Topps No. 315
"Leo managed the Giants into the most exciting pennant won in the National League in 1951. One of the most knowledgeable of baseball men, Leo has been a manager since 1939.
Before coming to the Giants in 1948, Leo was the Brooklyn leader. As a player, he appeared in the majors with the Yankees, Reds, Cardinals and Dodgers.
A colorful personality."
-1952 Red Man No. NL-1
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